

Naval War College Review

Volume 3
Number 2 *February*

Article 1

1950

February 1950 Full Issue

The U.S. Naval War College

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Recommended Citation

Naval War College, The U.S. (1950) "February 1950 Full Issue," *Naval War College Review*. Vol. 3 : No. 2 , Article 1.

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Naval War College: February 1950 Full Issue

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICERS



INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICERS

FOREWORD

Information Service for Officers was established by the Chief of Naval Personnel in 1948. It contains lectures and articles of professional interest to officers of the naval service.

The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department or of the Naval War College.

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Dr. John Fairbank

Issued Monthly By
The Department of Correspondence Courses
U. S. Naval War College
Newport, R. I.

REQUIREMENTS FOR WORLD LEADERSHIP

A lecture delivered by
Hon. John Nicholas Brown
at the Naval War College
December 19, 1949

When I was first written to, many months ago, asking if I would give a lecture to the Naval War College class, on the "Requirements for World Leadership", I confess that the task seemed quite beyond me, because I am neither a college professor nor am I a military expert. And, furthermore, the requirements for world leadership seemed to me so difficult to analyze and so difficult to trace in proper relation, one to the other, that my first inclination was to write as polite a letter as I could and say, "No, thank you". But, when I realized the honor which was inherent in the invitation, and when I recalled that my experience with the navy and with the members of the War College classes in the past had all lead me to believe that they were kind in their criticisms, I decided to risk it.

Today it is a truism to state that the United States of America has world leadership—challenged, yes, but nevertheless, ours. And in thinking on what basis that world leadership shall be maintained, I have attempted to set down briefly a few remarks which I hope you will consider.

In the beginning I would like to start with a document—a document of perhaps an unusual character because it is not only current—that is to say—new, but also new from the point of view of the age of those who wrote it.

The Honorable John Nicholas Brown was former Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air. He is one of New England's outstanding citizens and is a member of numerous boards and societies.

I do not know if you are familiar with a publication called "The Next Voter". "The Next Voter" entitles itself, "A New Venture in Political Commentary" and is written, edited, and published twice monthly by the students of the Political Science Course at Brooks School, North Andover, Mass. These are boys of the High School age. This publication has had a good deal of interesting comment by the newspapers and also by some of our leaders. The last issue, the December issue, contains as a lead editorial the following—and I will, with your permission, read part of it to you. The school boys start as follows:

"It is interesting though rather futile to speculate by which epithet the first half of the twentieth century will be known. We have won two wars and lost two peaces. We have experienced the rise and only partial fall of two new anti-God religions. We have witnessed the failure of the League of Nations, and have not yet seen the success of the United Nations. Fantastic dreams of the 19th century have become practical realities in the 20th: radio, television, air-communication, and atomic energy.

"The United States has abandoned the Monroe Doctrine in favor of the Marshall Plan. It has replaced isolationism by world-citizenship. From being the young and immature relative of some powerful and respected European nation, it has become the richest and strongest member of a family upon whom the burden of supporting some of the old and decrepit members has fallen.

"The United States is not only confronted with the herculean task of revivifying and re-animating Europe, but she also is faced with the problem of trying to establish a new balance of power not only in Europe but throughout the entire world. It is a task not made easier by the fact that the United States is relatively unfamiliar with European problems, and is relatively unseasoned in diplomacy.

"Which of the many changes, upheavals, reversals, crea-

tions, and annihilations will be called the outstanding characteristic of our era by future historians and generations? What label will be attached to the half-century which is about to come to an end? Only time can provide the answer.

"However, it seems to us that the real characteristic of this century has been psychological rather than material. It started with uncertainty which grew rapidly into fear—a half-century where fear has mercilessly spread its dreaded infection to every country, community, family, and individual. Close on the heels of the invading fear came hate. Both Hitler and the thirteen men in the Kremlin have found that hate is vital to their very existence.

"What are our fears? Fear of war or of impending war, fear of starvation, fear of unemployment, fear of financial disaster, and—worst of all—fear of our countrymen. At the beginning of the century Theodore Roosevelt admonished his countrymen: "Fear God and take your own part." Indeed the majority of Americans, and free people all over the world, feared God and nothing else. On the eve of 1950 we fear so much that unfortunately God has been pushed into the background.

"This fear did not just come, however. On the contrary it was cleverly propagated by clever men. Internationally, the Nazis and above all the Soviets have scientifically and propagandistically tried, not entirely unsuccessfully, to exploit the fear. Internally the same evil forces are at their destructive work. The Communists try to make us fear the coming class war and the disruption of our society.....

"On the other hand the American Fascists at the other extreme are, in our opinion, no less dangerous. They try to teach us a perverted and exaggerated sense of nationalism which they place under the appealing guise of 'Americanism'. They try to create fear and hatred of those who do not agree with their reactionary ideas and methods.

"Thus, while the last five decades have increased our influence abroad, they have also made for us many political and spiritual enemies.

"Fear's mortal enemy is faith. The two cannot co-exist. Therefore to win we must maintain an unshakable faith in ourselves and in our society. The merely negative statements of belief of the last decade are not nearly enough. We must state our beliefs and follow them with vigor and almost fanaticism.

"The forces of fear, hatred, persecution, and destruction have united with the aggressive passion and persuasion of the first half of the century. Let the opposed forces of *freedom, tolerance, and fearlessness*, be united with the same determination, passion and faith in the second half of the century. It is to be our task, and we are ready for it, to give later historians the opportunity, after such an awful start to call the whole of the twentieth century: **THE AGE OF FREEDOM!**"

In this editorial our young school boys give three essentials—freedom, tolerance, and fearlessness. They have stressed what I believe is important, namely that freedom is a positive concept and should not be considered in the negative way in which lately it has been expressed. It is not freedom from fear and want, but rather freedom to act and live as we desire. By the same token, tolerance should not be considered merely as a negative virtue. Tolerance should not mean such a lack of caring and believing that anything goes. Likewise, fearlessness, that special virtue of the military, can only be a virtue if it includes the conquering through knowledge. If fearlessness is achieved through blindness and ignorance then it degenerates into foolhardiness.

It would seem that the dilemma of our time can best be pointed up by the dilemma in which the concept of liberty now finds itself. The 19th century man believed in certain tenets which

included freedom, tolerance, and fearlessness, tenets which not properly understood have left the 20th century man hamstrung by his own idealism. This does not mean that I do not trust the basic concepts. Certainly, academic freedom, for instance, must be preserved and yet, as we find ourselves attacked by those who use unscrupulously our own modes of thought, how far, I wonder, can we allow ourselves the luxury of being harassed for the sake of not being unfair to the subversive?

In thinking of America's current position it is not long before we come to a realization that the position of world power and leadership which is America's today is based upon those human qualities which are conveniently grouped under the heading Morale. Nations are in essence men and what men think and what they are is what the nation becomes.

I sometimes remember the difference between 1916 and 1942. In the first case young men marched off to war with an enthusiasm and an elan which was based upon their belief—then vivid and real—that never again would this bloody business be repeated. They came back firm in the belief that wars actually would be no more. We may now call it foolish. It certainly has been proved unfounded. But at the time that idealism seemed valid indeed. Perhaps the greater sense of realism in the early 1940's was a healthy thing. Yet the cynicism which prevailed during the second world war, and certainly in the four years which have elapsed since its conclusion, has left us with fears and doubts, and wars and rumors of wars. I have always marveled at the magnificent job which the Army, the Navy, and the Marines succeeded in doing in inspiring this great body of young Americans with the spirit and the morale which was necessary to win. It shows that a proper understanding of the problems of military personnel, combined with other factors, makes for the success of these enterprises.

So, gentlemen, I come to state as my first requisite for world leadership—Morale. Whether in peace, so-called, or in war it is this human factor which is all important. In the concept of morale I should like to mention three components.

First, and by far the least important, I call well-being. Certainly the economic and material side of the picture is of great importance and I need not spend time in talking too much about these things. We all know our great economic strength, and yet I submit that this aspect of the case is far less important than some others. Certainly under bombardment and alarms, and having the very opposite of well-being, Great Britain showed the stuff of which her citizens were made, and so did Germany and Japan.

Secondly, I name leadership. Leadership is a function which you gentlemen have been called to exercise professionally all your lives. It would be an act of supererogation for me to tell you much about personal leadership, but in a discussion of the nation's morale there comes in not only the military but also civilian leadership. In civilian leadership I wish to include not only political leadership but also the kind of day to day standing-in-a-community which is represented by the doctor, the clergyman, the school superintendent for instance, as well as the harassed business man who gives his time to head some civic drive. All of these have their important place, yet on the political scene can sometimes assume too great importance as, we know so well, happened in countless other countries all through history.

Third, of all the prerequisites for national morale by far the most important is a basis of common belief. I fear that this comes close to Education for Education today in the minds of many Americans has taken the place once held by Religion. Perhaps that is another way of saying that Education was always part of religion—or putting it another way around, that Education is Religion with

God left out. Whatever it is, Education is the modern way of welding America together. I am greatly disturbed by the tendency in this country to abandon the Liberal Arts in American education. The natural sciences, important, perhaps essential, as they are, nevertheless contain within themselves a contradiction in terms, for the basis of scientific education is the training in how not to believe. Scientific education is synonymous with the education of scepticism. Alas, what is needed today is the belief held by all of what the material things of this world shall be used for. What good is it simply to know the means if the ends are ignored or misunderstood? It, therefore, seems to me tremendously important that the roots of our civilization be thoroughly understood; that we realize the streams with headwaters in Greece, in Rome, and in the Hebrew world, which flow together to form our own Christian civilization. For without these understandings and without knowing the wellsprings of Man's greatest geniuses, how can we find our common words anything but trite and hollow epithets. That is one of the reasons why so many of us shudder when we hear over the radio words like Democracy, Way-of-Life, even the sacred word Freedom itself. We know that the people who utter these shibboleths have no understanding of their overtones.

I have called Morale the requisite for national world leadership. But there is a second factor very closely akin yet separable, which I shall call, simply, Belief. We are now moving from the lesser to the greater, for one can have Morale without Belief but not Belief without its attendant result Morale. I am not now thinking purely in terms of religious belief, important as that is. I am thinking of the national requirement for belief in America's mission. Does it seem very old fashioned to speak once more of our mission? Yet I believe that there is only one reading of history. To use a phrase of the end of the last century—I call it, "America's Manifest Destiny". It is ours, whether we like it or not—this fearsome thing called Power. Our problem is how to use

it. Certainly one of our fundamental requirements is to understand it and thus believe in it.

We Americans are a curious mixture of shyness and bombast. Perhaps the psychologists would tell you that our boasting comes from our basic feeling of insecurity—I don't know. But I do know this, that we are not only the most powerful nation on the face of the globe today, but that there is no reason why we should not stay so for a long time to come; that the vistas of opportunity and adventure which lie before us are immeasurable; and that all we need is a little courage, a little steadiness, and above all a belief in the rightness of our cause. I believe in the inevitability of our triumph, not of the collapse of Capitalism, as is so loudly shouted at us today. I believe in this self-adjusting mechanism we own and operate, a political and economic mechanism which already has proved incomparably better than any tyranny that has ever existed. Do these things sound like political clap-trap? I submit I am merely stating facts.

Sometimes, when I get discouraged by the silliness of the American scene, I am helped by an historical analogy. I know how dangerous historical analogies are. They really are unsound and yet they are fun and, if not taken too seriously, sometimes lead to a new understanding. So with your permission I should like to call to your attention the parallel between our present state and Ancient Rome.

Let me hasten to say that I am not trying to prove that we are at a point analogous to the breakup of the Roman Empire. I admit the barbarian tribes do seem rather close sometimes. No, we have a long way to go before a modern Alaric sacks our modern Rome. By 410 A. D. Rome had been master of the civilized world for over half a thousand years. She had reached the apogee, had

ered a process of fission, and eventually had succumbed. We not nearly at that stage. I say this first because we are still too young, second, we are still expanding, and in my opinion I continue to do so.

It is not any one historic event to which I wish to drawlogy but rather to a certain similarity between the modernmerican scene and certain characteristics not so often explained in the schoolboy textbooks but nevertheless obviously present in greater or less degree through the long stretch of Roman history.

First off, let us look at the fact that Ancient Rome was founded by a conglomeration of refugees of different races much as our own country was. This process of bringing together men of different nationalities continued throughout her long history. While at first a certain stamp, or homogeneous attitude, existed, as Rome increased in world importance there flowed to her men of every nation, particularly men from the older civilization to the East. Thus we see a truly cosmopolitan civilization based upon the bringing together and merging of numerous ethnic and cultural strains. One example of this is the large number of Jews in Rome at the beginning of the so-called Roman Empire. Indeed the presence of Orientals is known about from the description of their religious beliefs and practices. I think particularly of the chapel dedicated to the Mithraic rite which is found under the Christian church of San Clemente.

I should also like to point out that in the Empire period men from the provinces rose to great prominence. Many of the most famous Emperors—such as Trajan (53-117) Spain; Antoninus Pius (86-161) family came from Nimes, France; Diocletian (245-313) in Dalmatia—did not come even from Italy.

Thus it can be seen that Rome derived her power from the

amalgamation of different strains and the welding together by means of a melting-pot-process of many races and cultures.

Perhaps of all the similarities between our own American scene and Ancient Rome the genius for material as against spiritual things is the most obvious. The Ancient Romans were never creators of things of the spirit, either in art or in literature, as had been the Greeks; but for this lack they made up by giving the world the finest engineering civilization that existed until the modern age. Their great roads, amphitheaters, and aqueducts are still scattered over the face of Europe from the walls of Hadrian in Scotland to the deserts of Africa and on into the East. We still find these remains of Ancient Roman glory and power exemplifying the greatest tradition of building in the large which the world was to see for many a long century.

Furthermore, the Roman age is characterized by emphasis on rapid communication. The courier system based on the excellent military roads spanned the civilized world and made possible a centralized administration to control the vast Empire under its command. While of course the telephone and the radio were not available, the Classical equivalent never approached by any other people was the fast mail service developed by the centralized system of Government which emanated from the Eternal City itself.

The study of the territorial expansion of the Roman state leads me to point out that, first, it is based upon the use of a Navy and, second, it was not always agreeable to the inhabitants of Rome itself. What I mean is that the invention of a more seaworthy and faster naval vessel which could actually grapple with the enemy made it possible for Rome to control the Mediterranean and so on through the first half of her history we see the essential role which sea power played in her expansion. But this expansion, as I indicated, was not always looked upon by certain conservative

segments of the population as desirable any more than we today, all of us, agree with some of the entangling alliances this country seems engaged in making. In other words, there was an isolationist party in Ancient Rome as well as in America; but the logic of events forced Rome to her Imperial destiny just as I believe we today are forced into taking an ever stronger position as world leader. The necessity of maintaining control over the grain shipments from Egypt and from what was then the fertile North African coast, the threat to her commerce by means of the inroads of business from the East and the North, the importance of maintaining what she already had by increasing her boundaries, seem to me analagous in so many ways to our situation today. Inevitably, as nations increase in power they find it necessary to expand further, not for the sake of expansion itself but in order to protect what they have. This process can be seen today in the actions of the Soviet Union which has attempted to throw around its own heartland a zone of puppet states. Certainly Okinawa today is in our hands because we already possessed Hawaii, just as Hawaii was originally acquired because we controlled the Pacific Coast. Now comes the problem of Formosa and its relation to the Philippines. And so on will the problems extend just as ripples flowing from a stone thrown in a millpond.

The Roman people originally set up a city state, a remarkably coherent system of government which worked for two or three hundred years with marked success but, like all governments basically designed for relatively small operations, it broke down under the stress of world responsibility. The period which interests me most in the long history of Rome is the last century B. C., when through a series of events, each associated with an individual name, deep rifts were caused in the basic structure of the Republic. Take for instance the armed uprising led by Marius, the people's champion, and then by his rival Sulla, who represented the conservative

element. These so weakened the structure of Government that it bowed beneath the weight of its world responsibilities and became prey to the dictatorial genius of Julius Caesar. Yet the interesting thing to me is that after Caesar was murdered, his young nephew Octavius, his self-styled heir and eventual master of the world, proceeded to revive the ancient Republic. He refused any Eastern title such as King, insisted upon the elections as in the past, but saw to it that he kept the power inherent in the Tribuneship of the people. If you had been living in Rome at that time, Octavius would not have seemed to have the attributes that history books associate with the world Emperor. Indeed this was merely a military title somewhat similar to Field Marshall or General of the Army. Octavius strove to revive and reconstitute the Republican constitution which had been put aside during the Civil Wars and yet, as so often in history, restorations become new entities themselves. The position of First Citizen—or Princeps—assumed by Octavius and passed on to the long series of men we call Roman Emperors, ceased to signify what was originally intended and became in fact the central autocratic power which we now associate with the Roman Empire. At the same time the inadequate and overburdened Republic civil administration was greatly expanded and there developed the inevitable Governmental bureaucracy which seems always to be present with the consolidation of great civil power.

On the educational and cultural side, I should like to point out that Rome conquered Greece and removed forever any further threat from Macedon and, in conquering Greece, she brought to Rome Greek teachers, Greek drama and literature, and the treasures of Greek art. Roman youth was sent to finishing school in Athens and in Rhodes. Greek teachers were brought into the households of patrician families to be tutors to their children. This is a situation very similar to the American conquest of Europe from where, over the last years, we have ourselves brought to this country large

quantities of European art and have found great satisfaction in sending Rhodes scholars to Oxford and other young men to study on the Continent. Yet we find it very difficult in this country to develop any original artistic style of our own.. Our painters derive from the School of Paris and even in the realm of the movies the great technical supremacy of Hollywood rarely equals the artistic excellence of many films made in Europe.

Furthermore, the Romans were a fickle people. Their athletic heroes were exalted one year and cast down the next. They rejoiced in great spectacles like our Middle Western football games or even our World Series. Roman youths cared more about taking their exercise vicariously as some of us do. Others competed in the Ancient Grecian games, but in Greece, as witness the Emperor Nero, who at sixty-six, made a tour of Greece and was successfully and successively acclaimed at all the games which he had arranged to have held all in the same year.

Lastly, I want to speak of what I consider to be the most important subject for us to study, namely the gradual increase in franchise granted over the years by Rome itself. It was largely on this basis that she managed to maintain so long her hold on so varied a population. The vast so-called Provinces like North Africa, Spain, Gaul, and the Provinces in the East were ruled by former consuls who were rewarded for political success at home by being given a position of complete dictatorial power over these pro-consular provinces. This was a very lucrative post as the pro-consuls were able to extort enormous sums of money from the people under their sway. The tax gathering system by which taxes were farmed out to companies who paid an agreed upon sum and then proceeded to collect as much as they possibly could, led to a great, if nefarious business. Yet it was the bringing of men of military experience, who often became the governors and rulers of these provinces, as ad-

ministrators back to the central capital which eventually amalgamated the different parts of the Empire and brought into a closer harmony the different kinds of administrations. It could be said perhaps that the Empire was the conquering of the City of Rome and its basically Republican constitution by the more autocratic type of Government which had existed in the provinces. Yet we must never forget that the vestigial remains of the Republican system of Government continued in the presence of the Senate in Rome to the end of the Empire.

Now you may ask why do I mention these matters which seem to have little or no relation to the current American scene. It is only because I believe our particular destiny—call it Imperial if you will, although this word must be defined quite differently in our time—is already forcing us to place people in positions of responsibility in foreign countries much as did Rome so many centuries ago—our General Clays and MacArthurs for instance are not too dissimilar to Roman pro-consuls. I am not trying to say that we can draw a close analogy from the past or that by analogy we can predict with any degree of accuracy things to come. I do submit, however, that the same causes bring similar results and that, while no two causes are ever exactly alike, I do think that over the years the destiny of America will be toward a world hegemony, not like the Roman but having nevertheless many points of similarity. Many of our troubles today in this country come because our Republican Government, quite adequate at first to the town meeting in New England and then made to function as an adequate government for a continental nation, is finding difficulty in adjusting itself to the demands of world leadership. The Isolationists in this country were correct when they looked with grave mistrust at America's ability to do anything about the outside world. Yet events have overleapt our own desire and against our will we are forced into the difficult position of power and, therefore, of responsibility for

which as yet we are not entirely fitted. But I look forward with the sure conviction of ultimate success because I believe that, if there is one characteristic of the American people, it is our adaptability. We come from so many races and have a system of government so flexible and so easily managed that we have proved in the past, as we know we shall in the future, our ability to develop a leadership where it is needed and which will be adequate to the strains and stresses of world responsibility. All we need is to believe in our destiny and we shall find the way.

Lastly, I want to point out that it was the gradual increase by Rome of the franchise, the right of citizenship, to other people—first to the surrounding natives of the Italian Peninsular and then to the provinces as they became more closely akin in civilization to Rome itself, that she developed her rule of Law. We remember that St. Paul, a Jew, living 2,000 miles from Rome, claimed his Roman citizenship and thus his right to be tried under what was certainly the most nearly fair administration of justice so far devised. I believe that we in this country must develop increased interest in Law and in the propagation of our Anglo-Saxon code of justice and that by some method of world association yet to be devised we must form a government, not so much supranational in the sense that the World Federalists speak of, but rather by means of a system of international citizenship under our own system which can have a two-fold advantage—first a single system of justice and the economic advantage which comes therefrom and, second, the calling forth of responsibility which is inherent in all citizenship, because citizenship is fundamentally two-way. The privilege of citizenship is to serve as well as to derive the benefits of protection from the central authority. But, gentlemen, these matters are in the womb of our destiny—they are to be worked for continually but not to be expected immediately. The day to day events are trivial compared to the long swing of history and thus as the Pax Romana

brought peace and prosperity to the conglomerate peoples of the ancient world, so I believe, with proper faith, with the belief in the rightness and justice of our cause, with the infusion through our own body politic of the tradition which has already made us great, we can look forward to a long era of American leadership and the Pax Americana. But the Pax Americana, this world leadership of ours, is not to be thought of as something imperial in the old sense. Imperialism and Colonialism, as practiced in the old days are gone forever. Dr. Vannevar Bush in the beginning of his new book *Modern Arms and Free Men* points it up when he says:

“It is highly important that the general outlook of the people be sound as we face the future. If we had been in abject terror, facing a new inevitable war that would destroy our cities, our farms, and our way of life, we would have followed some Pied Piper in the last election who would have led us into the sea. This we emphatically did not do. In spite of alarms, in spite of the prophets of doom, we face the future with resolution. If, as a people we had felt all-powerful, that we could speak and the world would tremble, that we had a mission to rule the unenlightend, that we were a super-race, we would have followed a demagogue. There was not even a single demagogue of the sort in sight on the national horizon. The steadiness of purpose of the American people is our hope and refuge.”

This steadiness of purpose is the essence of Morale. On national morale depends the existence of this country. With the prospect of our glorious future and armed with the knowledge of what can be done and also what cannot, we may confidently look forward to the epithet our schoolboys have suggested for their age
—THE AGE OF FREEDOM.

CHINA'S FUTURE

A lecture delivered by
Dr. John Fairbank
at the Naval War College
October 31, 1949

Gentlemen:

I have been a student of one of your earlier speakers, Dr. T. F. Tsiang, the present Chinese delegate to the United Nations. I have also been a subordinate in the Embassy in China under Mr. W. W. Butterworth of the State Department, another of your earlier speakers. Consequently, I feel very fortunate that I appear here after them. I speak as an historian who has been associated with social scientists. I have had about twenty years practice in trying to deal with the Chinese scene in fifty-three minutes. This today, will be briefer and so I will make it a bit condensed.

I am concerned with the historical and social science approach to China and our China problems. And I want to do three things: first, characterize the old Chinese society; second, characterize the process of revolution which is now turning that society inside out; and third, comment, from that point of view, on American relations with China, past, present and future.

My main idea is that China is a different and unique social system or organization or society, a group of people living in a peculiar way of their own, and will continue to be so. And of course, I assume that the United States is also a unique social system which will continue more or less in its own pattern. Neither

Dr. John Fairbank is Professor of History, and Associate Chairman of the Committee on International and Regional Studies in charge of the China Area Program at Harvard University. He is the author of the book entitled, "The United States and China," which was published in 1948.

we nor they will change very greatly in our system of values, and the general trends of our development.

My second idea is that China is in a state of revolution, by which I mean gradual social change, not just disorder, but change in the structure of the society, how it is put together, how the individuals fit into it, what they expect, how they motivate themselves in their daily lives. And, of course, I have to note that the United States is in a process of change too. You may not call it revolution but still it is a rapid social change in this country with which we are more or less accustomed; we are developing. So these two societies are both moving along in streams of development.

Now a third idea that I would put forward is that China is obviously a factor in American security. It is desirable to keep China from being our enemy, but that approach to China, purely as a security problem, is not, it seems to me, the whole story. China has to be understood for itself, as it is. In other words, we have to maintain a high degree of objectivity. What is good for the Chinese people, comparatively speaking? What will they take? What will they do? It will be ineffective if we try to *use* China. I think our frame of reference should be that we are trying to work with Chinese social forces, to influence the process of change in China, not merely to use it. I think we have fallen into trouble through the effort to *use* the situation without enough consideration about how the Chinese felt about it themselves.

I have divided this presentation into two parts: first, the continuity of Chinese conditions and institutions; and second, the continuity of United States interest and policy. My effort is to establish the continuity or trend in China, and in this country in our relations to China, so as to make a projection toward the future—to foresee what our relations may be in days to come.

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I begin, therefore, with the continuity of Chinese conditions and institutions; and, as I said, I will take the first topic, the characteristics of the old traditional way of life; then come later to the question of revolution. Now this traditional way of life, I think, we have to take up under the four headings: economics, politics, sociology, ideology; these things that we use in our universities to make what analysis we can of how a society functions, what holds it together. I will go rapidly over these major topics which you are, to a considerable extent, well acquainted with.

First of all, take the Chinese economy in the old traditional way of life. It was a rice economy, or at least an economy of intensive agriculture, in South China, for example. Now this intensive agriculture where you plant each blade of rice by hand, called for a very heavy application of manpower to a small amount of land and irrigation of that land with a heavy application of water. This technique gets maximum land use, intensively, through the heavy use of manpower. Manpower is cheap and you use lots of it, lots of people. By doing that, in this economy, you can maintain a self-sustaining mechanism—a lot of people living at a low level but feeding themselves by intensive agriculture, putting their manpower into small plots of land. Well, that results in a dense population and a crowded countryside. As you know, if you fly over China, you pass one plot of trees after another with fields in between. The trees are where farmhouses would be in Illinois or Iowa, but each of those clumps of trees is a village of two or three hundred people. Where it would be an American farm family, you have hundreds of people living on the land, using these half-acre plots apiece, and so that means a low standard of living. And the result of this economic situation over the centuries has been a low evaluation of the individual and a high evaluation of social order. The individual is cheap, there are lots of individuals, coolie labor is a glut; you can dispense with it, use it, throw it away. But because

there are lots of people and these people have to live together, there is a high evaluation put on maintaining social order, training persons to be orderly, to maintain their status, to be polite,—all these various things that you expect of Chinese. They live in a crowded situation that we are not acquainted with.

Now turn to the sociology of this old society. Social structure is centered on the family as a unit, not on the individual. The whole system is reflected in the custom of arranged marriage, just to take one example. If you grew up in a Chinese family in the old style, your marriage is arranged for you—you never see, before your marriage, the person you marry. The marriage is arranged between families, between your family and another; you are merely the tool of your family; you are used to create a marriage to carry on the family. That all ties in with ancestor worship and all these various things, as you know. This practice, of course, in the old family systems means a low evaluation of youth, as compared to age. The elders are the venerable respected people; they are closest to the ancestors who were also venerated. It also means a low evaluation of woman and a male domination; the woman goes *out* of her household into that of her husband. The husband *stays* in his household. As the younger son, he gets married in the big courtyard of another house. Ideally, the daughter-in-law comes in; she is the stranger, the slave who works her way up in the new family.

Now with that social system based on the family, there is another very striking characteristic of the old Chinese society—that it is a bifurcated class structure. Well, that is a fancy name for the idea that there was a ruling stratum and a mass of peasantry below, say 80% of peasants living on the land in their farms and villages and above them a ruling stratum into which they might move, of course. There was nobility; you could rise if you were good, but on the whole people didn't too much.

This ruling stratum was, you might say, a triangular arrangement of three dominant groups. It is a very interesting thing to study because it had tremendous stability and is dying so hard today. On the three different sides you had three different kinds of people. They all played ball together and were tied in with the families. On one side you had the landlord families, people who got a little surplus off the land. And maybe they weren't just grasping landlords; they would even till their own land, but still they got some surplus by renting out their land. So they had a little leisure; they didn't have to work all the time, at least their sons didn't have to work all the time.

So the landlord class produced a second side of this triangle, the scholar class. You had to have time as a boy to learn Chinese—it takes you a long time to do it at anytime. The landlord class produced scholars by studying the classics. And these scholars, in turn, produced the third side of this triangle, the officials, because from the scholars, as you know, the officials were selected by the examination system. The triangle was complete when the official used his position to buy more land, and he could do it. The official was at the top in this society and thus maintained his landlord and landowner position. In this way the upper stratum maintained its ideology, its social organization, its values, its way of life with great stability over, as you know, 2,000 years, back to the unification of the Empire in 221 B. C. or another thousand years behind that through the period of Confucius and beyond.

Now that meant that the peasant was out of government. The peasant did not participate in the activities of this ruling stratum and did not decide how much he would be taxed or anything of that kind. The affairs of state were the concern of the official landlord—scholar type, the top class. On the other hand, you have to recognize that this old Chinese social structure left the

government rather superficial. The peasant in his family units, in his villages, took care of himself, more or less; he just paid his taxes and the government was the rather thin upper crust over the surface of this vast mass of millions and millions of peasants.

Now suppose we turn to the political structure of this old China. China was a unit secluded geographically from any comparable unit, so it was the universe, the Emperor, the Son of Heaven who ruled everything. Barbarians were round-about it, but there were no equals. The official class I have spoken of comprised a bureaucratic government which ran the Empire on behalf of the Emperor using his prerogatives.

Then there developed in the course of Chinese history another very interesting political feature, namely that barbarians began to come into China and conquer the place periodically—a very interesting phenomenon and very important I think. The reason this was possible was that on the steppe in Inner-Mongolia where these barbarians lived as pastoral nomads, they developed a striking power, militarily, through the mounted archer, which the settled Chinese farmers couldn't withstand. One million, or maybe two million at most, of these steppe nomads, out on the desert, where it was too dry to cultivate anything with their type of culture, could send an army like that of the Mongols, or later the Manchus, into China and knife through any number of peasantry and conquer the country. A very amazing phenomenon that four hundred million, or maybe two hundred and fifty million in the old days of China, could be taken over by one or two million of these barbarian invaders. How did it happen? It happened several times in succession; the Chinese would make a comeback and then the barbarians would sweep in again a couple of hundred years later and stay for one hundred or two hundred years. The Chinese would throw them out, and they would come back in—a real sequence of this thing.

So the Chinese dealing with the barbarian is part of Chinese history; it is part of Chinese society. It is an important factor of their political life—this constant question of how you deal with the strong, but uncultivated, barbarian menace. Of course, one thing to do is to play him off against other barbarians. When the Chinese were strong enough they did that. For century after century they would deal with one group of Mongols and then deal with another group; they would back one against another in their tribal wars out in the desert on the steppe, and in that way would keep them neutralized, keep them harmless. But from time to time the steppe would become unified and then they'd come in. The Mongols came in and ruled China for more than a century. The Manchus came in two centuries later, and they ruled China for two hundred and seventy-six years, a very long time. They did it, of course, by a combination of diarchy in administration; that is, rule by both groups, using Chinese as officials, as well as Manchus. And combined with that there was what you might call cultural symbiosis; that's a fancy word, but I think it is useful to express the idea that the two cultures were maintained separately, side by side. The Manchus kept their own culture, their own way of life, their distinct entity as Manchus; they didn't inter-marry, they didn't let the Manchus work. They kept them on stipends as warriors in garrisons, kept them separate, and only by keeping this small group of Manchus separate were they able to maintain that power so long.

Now that resulted in a very interesting political tradition in China; namely, that the dynasty and the bureaucracy, the Emperor and his family and all the officials, stood together against the mass of people because they were the ruling group. The mass of the people were the people from whom you got the wherewithal

to maintain yourself; you took it out in taxes. The dynasty might be an alien dynasty, but the bureaucracy still would stick with it. That was a peculiar situation. The secret of that, I think, lies in this element of ideology.

I'll move on to ideology, the ideology of Confucianism—one of the neatest, most comprehensive, and most stable sets of ideas ever evolved for the establishment and maintenance of social order. The individual fitted into a status in society and was trained to know how he should behave at all times. Not the kind of training you know about here, because you train people within the framework of naval service, or military service, to know how to behave at all times in connection with your profession alone. Well, Confucianism is that sort of system in all aspects of life—how the husband should behave toward his wife; how the same man as son should behave toward his father, or his mother-in-law, or his child; or how this man, as a subject, should behave toward his ruler. All this was worked out in minute detail and indoctrinated in the Chinese mind along with the learning of the language. You began to study Chinese by studying the Chinese language in the Classics. The Classics begin by giving you this ideology immediately, so that you can't grow up, you can't become literate, without absorbing this whole system of status, relationships, how you should behave—Confucianism, in short. As your mind develops, it is cast in that mold.

The idea is still very strong in Chinese life that education is indoctrination in order to maintain the stability of social institutions including the political power of those who are ruling. Now, Confucianism was not one of these authoritarian despotisms. The Emperor was all powerful, but he had to act according to the rules of the game, just as any subject should act. According to the Confucian rules, the ruler was supposed to do the right thing

at the right time in an almost ritual manner. If he did the right thing he got tremendous prestige, and this prestige was believed to have a certain influence. His good conduct gave him power over the people. They would admit, when they saw his example, that he was a good man and should rule, and so moral prestige became essential to the conduct of government. This rather superficial, not very powerful, government ruled the mass of the peasantry by morale prestige, doing the right thing, therefore having the virtue which gave it the right to rule. That idea is still very strong.

Now the revolutionary process hit this old society. Let me take that up as my second main consideration. The revolutionary process, which began in modern China in the last century, is gaining momentum; things are happening faster and faster today. Let's look at it economically, ideologically, socially, politically. To begin economically,—of course, foreign trade came in and it produced an agrarian crisis, as it has in most countries. The farmer who had been producing his own cotton goods on his own little farm now began to find that Manchester and Lancashire cotton and later Japanese cotton goods or Indian cotton goods were splitting the China market. Finally, the factories came into China itself, in Shanghai, Japanese or British factories and some Chinese. When the farmer became dependent on the money economy, this new cotton goods knocked out the handicraft industry that had produced cotton for the farmer in the old days. Cities began to grow up and industrialization came in, and that led, of course, to a population increase, or a tendency toward population increase, pressing on subsistence. You know that kind of economic situation; it produces extreme poverty; we know and can understand it; you just translate the material terms for yourself and you've got the economic picture. The thing we neglect, I think, is the sociological and ideological side that goes with it.

Well what happens sociologically? The family was pretty hard hit. Why? Because in the old days the family was a self-contained unit; you functioned in it, working for it, living from it, without any personality problem or wage problem or ownership of property. Everything was in common in the family; you worked in the field, you ate at the table, your father died, you succeeded him, no money changed hands. Now in the new China, industrialization comes in. If you are in the city, or even in the country, you do something for wages; money payments come in. If you are a working individual, you get paid a wage; you are independent of your family, independent of this little microcosm you formerly would have lived in. And so the family doesn't have quite its old cohesion. The mother-in-law can't control the daughter-in-law, when the daughter-in-law makes her own wages. The husband can't control the wife, when the wife is working somewhere in the city—his old control breaks down. Then freedom of marriage comes along. That is just another symptom, in contrast to the old arranged marriage, and so you get a youth movement. The young people begin to break away from the old family system. They say, "Age should not receive the only veneration; we are students and scholars; though young, we deserve a chance to live our own lives." The young students also use this old prerogative of the scholar being top dog. It used to be the old man who had time to learn everything in the classics, but now the scholar is the young student, still the scholar, but young.

At the same time you break down the family, you break down the old landlord system. The old landlord class begins to become an absentee landlord class. You move to the city, nowadays, if you are of this old scholar-gentry on the land. When you move to the city you are out of touch with the peasants, you do things for them impersonally that you used to do by personal contact, mediating their disputes, helping them in some of their

problems. The good side of the landlord-tenant relationship breaks down when you are an absentee; you just squeeze them for what they have to pay you in rent. Thus, peasant disorder more easily comes up. There are other reasons for peasant revolutions, but peasant revolution comes along. It comes in a Chinese cycle; actually, every two or three centuries peasant revolution has come in the past, in the course of things. It began about 1850 last time in China and is still there to use. Now this results in a great opportunity, socially speaking; the opportunity to use the new emancipated youth of China for the purpose of organizing the formerly inert peasantry of China, and that is the combination the Communists have got. Before them, of course, the Kuomintang had it; that is the combination that wins, because you organize this enormous manpower through it.

In politics, let us look at this revolutionary process in China. The first thing was a response to the West by imitating the West. The West was powerful, therefore you must imitate it; you become nationalistic, you act toward the West in the same way as the West acts toward itself or toward you; you have a consciousness of China as a nation among other nations for the first time, instead of being the whole empire and universe with nothing but barbarians around. And so you knock out the old dynasty, you kick out the Manchus who are foreigners after all, and set up a Republic in 1911. Well, that's the first phase. In response to the West, Chinese nationalism rose against the Manchus at last, knocking out the dynasty. Then the question comes up, how do you set up this new Chinese Republic back in 1911? You try the democratic process, a parliament and cabinet government with a president and all the stuff that the British were using. The British was the top nation at that period—even the Americans were using it. So you try that; it doesn't work. Why? Well, China is a different society; it is not that kind of society; there is no way in the world of making

parliaments work in China at that time. The old situation breaks down, Sun Yat-sen fails. The war lords take over and in the old Chinese style move in after the dynasty walks out, grabbing a little area in each part of China as before.

What finally happens as the solution of reorganizing the new China under the Republic? Well, you know the answer—party dictatorship was picked up by Sun Yat-sen. He was anti-Russian, on the whole, but was willing to cooperate with anybody. He didn't believe in Communism; but he used one of its principles for organizing the new China, namely, the selected group, the party dictatorship. The new elite stratum would take over the government just as the official class used to, and operate things nominally for the good of the peasant in the way the official class used to, carrying on the old tradition in a new form. Of course, it is also a new tradition, but it can't be a Western style parliamentary government. It's a party dictatorship that hangs together, following a leader; it has these Fascist, European-style or Communist-type overtones. Chiang Kai-shek became the leader; he set up his regime with himself at the top of the triangle of the party, the army, and the government. These three things he stood on; he was at the top of each. That was the system that organized China under the Kuomintang. Now it is very interesting to see, of course, that it is really the Soviet system, in a certain formal way; it is interesting to see that the Communists today carry on very much the same system. You can either say they got it from the Russians, or you can say they got it from the Kuomintang who got it from the Russians, or you could even find some evidence that Sun Yat-sen was working it out for himself before he took the Russian example, before the Russian revolution. We shouldn't say this is just the Russian influence. There is something in the Chinese scene that allows a party to come in and take the place of the old dynasty, or the old foreign invader;

this selected group that runs things. That appears to be happening today.

Now what happened ideologically in this revolutionary process? Of course they began studying the West, the United States—students coming here, using liberalism, individualism, the doctrines that made the West so strong. But then they found that in their crowded country they had a low standard of living, with all their traditions and different social context; liberalism didn't work out. It was insufficient to maintain and develop the degree of social order which they wanted. The whole idea of Western individualism seemed rather chaotic and anarchic. And today, when Secretary Acheson puts out his cover letter to the White Paper and refers to the fact that we will continue to hope for the triumph of the forces of "democratic individualism" in China, it proves to be a great mistake to say it. "Democratic individualism" is a golden word to us, I think, but it is a garbage word in China because they associate with this term individualism—the whole experience they had of the western invasion breaking up the family, leaving the average Chinese isolated without all these relationships that he was accustomed to having, atomized—incapable of doing anything by himself, so that he had to join a party if he was going to get results. All that idea is in their minds. So "individualism" is not the good thing we think it is, where the individual expresses himself and his personality. In China, it is a factor for disorder and difficulty and breakdown; they are against it. "Democratic individualism" therefore, they immediately translated their way. They ran editorials on it for weeks afterward and are still doing it, using it against us. They don't like it.

The Chinese Communists obviously have combined these ingredients in the Chinese scene. They show the most promise of anybody in recent decades of setting up a strong political order.

They have been using the peasant revolution on the land. Now, of course, they have turned the corner; they say they will have to industrialize, so henceforth it is a question of how much they can get out of the peasant, how far they can squeeze him. They will have peasant trouble from now on. Still they were able to use the breakup of the old family, the breakdown of the old landlord-gentry class, to put their own system in. It is a modification by which you are loyal, not to the family so much as to the party. So you join up. And where the gentry does not run things locally the party does, in this new way of organization. They are committed to industrialization and they proclaim themselves intensely nationalistic. That, of course, is a tough question—how far it is possible to combine a genuine Chinese nationalism with the Marxist ideology sent from Moscow. Of course we immediately say, “How about Titoism?” Mao Tse-tung immediately comes out saying, “The hell with Tito!”

Now that is, I think, a Chinese situation. In other words, what Mao Tse-tung says is for political purposes. Personally, I don't know whether China is going to be run by the Russians or not, aside from the fact that they are all Marxists.

Well, in this situation there are continuing elements. A poor dense population, facing famine in the year ahead because of the disastrous floods and famine in North China and on the Yangtse, is likely to be governed by a bureaucratic official class, a selected elite, in this case organized by the Communist party and likely to be strongly pro-Chinese. However, they may work it out with a tradition of alien influence and alien rule.

Now, let us look briefly at the American policy in relation to this Chinese scene. Our contact with China began in our seeking access for trade in 1784. And we got a treaty and extra-territoriality to give us greater access for trade in 1844. This idea

of access for trade developed in the "open door", which was as much British as American. The open door for trade in 1899 developed further into the idea for independence and integrity of China. So this idea of Chinese integrity and independence is more than a merely economically motivated idea on our part. Our trade with China has actually been rather small most of the time. We have also had extensive missionary and humanitarian interests in China. Part of our own democratic faith has found expression in hoping that we could help the Chinese to get what we regard as benefits from democracy, the American way of life. We have been expansive in the 19th and 20th centuries. We have also developed a certain sympathy I think for the Chinese personality—there is something about the Chinese individual toward which we feel rather sympathetic. He is in difficulty, he has a sense of humor, he is very civilized, he understands people. We get on with him usually, we understand his vices, we admire his virtues. It has been this friendliness which is not just an economic imperialistic ambition but also a matter of actual sentiment between peoples.

That is our background of a pretty good record, made possible, most likely, because the British did the dirty work in the 19th century. They fought the wars; we came along behind and took the opportunities. We didn't get on the spot until recently as the representative of the West. The British were the great Western representatives before. They took the rap in 1926 when China was feeling anti-foreign. It was anti-British. Now, of course, it is anti-American.

Up against this new situation—this new power with which we finished the last war, power on the Chinese scene because of the troops and armament that we have there, we preceded to make a series of errors. We made some good tries, but we also made some errors. And our problem now, it seems to me, is to study our post-war record against the background of Chinese conditions

and traditions and to chart a new course, not willfully, but with as much preception of these long term trends as we can. For that purpose the White Paper was put out, aside from the necessity of shutting off the Republicans. The White Paper was very bad news for us in China. The covering letter by Mr. Acheson played the document as though we had always been for Chiang Kai-shek when General Marshall was mediating. The Communists have jumped on that; they have said that the White Paper proved that General Marshall never was a mediator at all—which is their propaganda lie, doing the paper injustice of course. In general, we have wiped our feet on the Nationalist government without, on the other hand, ingratiating ourselves with the Communists. Nobody wants to ingratiate himself with the Communists; it doesn't work out. But either way you take it, we haven't made much progress in China with the White Paper. You have to recognize that it probably was not a help to put it out. Therefore, we have to capitalize on the advantage it gives us in our own thinking at home, because it does give us the record. And don't let anyone tell you, like Congressman Judd, that anything is suppressed and ought to be there that isn't. It is true the military record is not built up because that was not in the State Department's problems. The White Paper gives you the story condensed in a thousand pages. It ought to be studied, and our great opportunity in having it is that we can use it for purposes of study.

So I proceed now to name what I think are some of the errors which you can document from this body of documentation: Error number one, American sentimentality or wishfulness and hopefulness about China during the war, the big build-up about freeing China, the great heroic effort that was going on. But actually, it was a pretty tough spot for the poor Chinese to be in, and a lot of individual graft went on. People were trying to save themselves from inflation. We built up a fine picture and came

out with this policy that China must be one of the big five, and we must help China to become strong, united, and democratic at the end of the war. Therefore, we had a great hope, I think, which was unrealistic at the end of the war, to start us off on our activities in China.

Secondly, we showed bad judgment. We didn't look at the facts of the local situation when we refused to see that Chiang Kai-shek was on the way out, that he was going to lose to the Communists sooner or later. His system wasn't getting the basis of power in China in the form of a peasantry which it could use for taxes and an army. On the other hand, the Communists with their system, were getting the basis of power because they could use the peasantry to support an army and that would give the game to the Communists. We refused to see that. We thought we were so powerful we could change that; we didn't realize how difficult it is to get into China. You can get to the coast, you can get to the main cities, but you can't get inland. Logistically it is a nightmare.

Error number three: I think we were rather naive, because we put our faith in material things and, I think we all realize upon reflection that no social revolution, no process in the change of a society, the way people live together, and what they believe in and how they act toward one another, no process of that kind is purely a material matter. You may be able to slow it down by raising the standard of living and filling the belly, but that doesn't solve all problems. And we had a good deal of faith that by material means we could turn the course of the Chinese revolution—by arms, for instance. It was probably unlucky that we had so many arms on the Chinese scene, destined for many Chinese armies we had been training against Japan and continued—about half of them—in the Lend-Lease pipeline after the end of the war, as we did in no

other part of the world. We kept feeding in equipment to these Chinese troops. As a result, the Chinese Communists today have a better-armed army, with American equipment, than the Chinese ever had. But they are an anti-American army. The arms moved right through the Chiang Kai-shek troops which didn't have the morale to keep them. They were much easier to sell. The Chinese Nationalists had nothing to fight for which would keep them from selling arms when they got in a jam, or surrendering them when they were surrounded. And so this whole process went on, which is recorded by General Barr and others in the White Paper. For example, Chiang Kai-shek's troops, being on the defensive psychologically, would stay in the cities and on the railroads, as the Japanese did. In the cities they had their artillery, but you can't use artillery against the countryside. The Communists had no command posts, no dumps, nothing you could hit. They were scattered around the peasantry. You couldn't use the artillery of the United States to defeat the Communists. Eventually, the Communists began to capture this artillery, they bought up some of it. Then they were in clover, because they could use artillery against fortified strong points. And, when the Communists began to get some American artillery and turn it on the little cities and outposts, Chiang Kai-shek's troops were finished.

Error number four was, I think, a wrong emphasis or wrong proportion in our aid program to China. We put arms and economic aid first. We didn't have any way of dealing with the social situation or the sociological changes. What do you do with youth? What do you do with emancipated women? The Communists organized them, meanwhile, and we were sitting on the sidelines. We didn't do much ideologically. We talked about our own ideals, which are excellent, which apply to our country, and which we maintain and defend. Yet those ideals do not exactly

apply, in our terms, to the Chinese peasant. They must be translated somehow; and we haven't found out how to do it yet.

Error number five: We were inexperienced about what could be done. For the Chinese economy we thought we could send much more aid than we could. We found that a backward, undeveloped economy like China could not absorb the economic aid we sent. You could get it to the dock; you might get into the warehouse, or across the river at Shanghai, at a cost equal to the cost of a shipment to New York, but you couldn't get it up country. When you got it up country, you couldn't use the machinery we had put in. For example, we had a system of workshops for producing iron tools for the farmer to improve his tools and production. We had a big workshop and tool plant for each province. One of the tool plants was coming in crates off a barge; and you had to have a cement foundation for the tools. This meant a big local outlay, a lot of expense, increasing the inflation and placing a heavy burden on the local people to provide the foundation, even before you got the crates unpacked. To get into production you have to train operators and find them also.

Furthermore, we lacked experience in regard to the Chinese political tradition. We didn't understand the mandate of Heaven. The mandate of Heaven is an old Confucian conception, engraved in Chinese psychology, like the election process in the United States. One candidate in our presidential election gets a few more votes. He may actually get less votes, but he still gets more electoral votes, as at times in the past. He gets a few more votes and the rest of the country the next morning says, "He is the President." That's the majority rule, a bare majority sometimes. That is our custom. The mandate in Heaven is comparable. The idea is that, when a new contender for the supreme power obviously has popular support organized by using a combination of persuasion

and compulsion to work on the peasantry, he is nice to them; and those who are nice to you, you knock off, and there are others who are still nicer to you, and there are fewer of them to knock off. You get them lined up; you get them organized, and so on. When a leader in China has done this, there comes a point where he has the mandate of Heaven. He is in—he is the new dynastic organizer. That situation came back last Christmas. Chiang Kai-shek has been out ever since. When the leader is out, he is completely out, and it is just a case of clean up. So it has been impossible for us, whatever efforts we have made, to build up any strength against the Communists.

I think we have to be more conscious of our own type of strength, our own type of society—its own virtue. And it is a virtue in my view that consists of pluralism which, I feel, is a fancy word for a lot of agencies or expressions of power in the state, or having a diversified situation where there is no one dominant force, as exhibited in our having not only a public sector of government enterprises, but a private sector of private enterprises. And sometimes they are pretty big, but, nevertheless, these big corporations which the Marxists stare at as monopoly capitalism, are not government. They are something different and provide a sort of balance, so that we have in our system an element of strength with the balance which we have from a number of different agencies on the same level. And that, I think, goes with our whole concept of the rule of law, including private property, which safeguards the individual in his self expression. There is an idea there of not having the monolithic state where the party is a dictatorship, where the state does all the industrializing and the like. This doesn't mean that I am anti-socialist or pro-socialist. I think we are moving along in a progression (this is just my personal view)—progression where we are developing an increasing degree of government enterprise. But I think it is important for us to keep in mind this

principle of a balance among the forces in our society so that no one agency, association, or group is dominant.

Now, when we look at the Chinese scene, and most of the other Asiatic countries, it is perfectly obvious that they are not in such a situation and they cannot be, no matter how much we try. Say we are going to help the middle class; it isn't the same thing. And they are not our kind, in these sociological terms; there is nothing much we can do about it. They do have this tradition of the official class running things. The Japanese have it, and getting them away from the idea is going to take a long time. We have to compromise in a statesman-like sense, of retaining our own objectives and our own values and yet not assuming that we can make them prevail in the near future. You can't just go out and Americanize Asia. When you do, you stub your toe as we have in the recent past, unless, of course, you look around for the person who will play ball with us, who does subscribe to American principles. You find a Syngman Rhee in Korea or a Chiang Kai-shek in China. Our danger is that we are too ambitious about this, that we go in and support these people and say, "You've got to choose—this is our man. He is most like us, at least he is not a Communist, so we will support him." Well, I'm afraid of that, as a practical matter, not being effective. I think it is not going to work too well, if we are too ambitious about it. It works something like this. Chiang Kai-shek is on the spot, with a very tough post-war situation, inflation, many difficulties to overcome, everybody unhappy; and, if he does certain things to try to win peasant support, maybe he can undercut the Communists. He has had his chance for twenty years; it's still there, but in 1945 and 1946 we came along and we said, "Yes, you must make these reforms and we will give you a lot of aid." And he says to himself, consciously or unconsciously, "O. K., I'll take the aid and won't have to make the reforms, because if I make the reforms, I will be out, so I will take the aid." So the more aid

we give him, the less he has to make reforms, the less capable he is of competing with these Communists, or other people who are out organizing the peasantry on the countryside through reform. In effect, we give him the "Kiss of Death" to some extent. We can do that in any country in Asia, if we go in too heavily. We have got to figure out some way of trying to support a non-Communist situation without actually creating it. We can't back the status quo; we can't put people in positions where they rely on us and become, as the Communists say, "Running dogs of the American Imperialists", in the eyes of their own people, which discredits them and pushes them out.

To throw this out as a point—I think we are not going to get very far with a big anti-Communism ideological line in Asia. I think we will get a lot farther with an anti-Russian ideological line. In other words, we should avoid being doctrinaired.

Now it is very good for us to work out our own doctrines, our own faith, what we believe in in this country. Obviously, this country isn't going Communist. We want to understand what our ideology is and express it, believe it, but, when it comes to Asia, Asia is so different and is so close to being a setup for the Communists, I think we would do well to *lay off* Communism and *lay on* Russia. You see Communism is the fine dream. It is the thing you can do in Asia—to knock off the landlord or kick out the invader, who is the imperialist by Communist definition. Communism is a pretty good thing to the poor down-trodden Asiatic, just as an ideology to dream about, to work for. "All stand together and we will have a new day; we'll liberate; everything will be fine." It works as a rallying point, and attacking it, I don't think, is our strong point. On the other hand, if we go in for an anti-Russian line, we've got all kinds of material. There are the Russians sitting in Manchuria, doing all kinds of dirty work in the back-